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Abstract 
Data from the Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW) are used to 
study portfolio allocations change in response to fluctuations in wealth. In particular I test 
for the prediction of models with habit formation that changes in liquid wealth will affect 
households' risk aversion and risky asset investment. After controlling for the decision to 
enter and leave the risky asset market, I find, in contrast with other studies (Brunnermeier 
and Nagel, 2008 and Chiappori and Paiella, 2008), that changes in wealth do help to explain 
changes in asset allocation.  
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The recent ￿nancial turmoil severely cut into the value of households￿￿nancial assets. A year
after the onset of the crisis, the ￿nancial wealth of European households had fallen by almost
8% and that of Italian households by 7%. The fall was even sharper in the US, bringing the
level backdown to that registered at the end of 2006.
In the same period the share of stocks in total household wealth shrank considerably. Be-
tween the second quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2008 the share of risky assets in the
main European countries fell on average from 30% to just over 20%; the same pattern holds
for the US. In Italy, the share of risky assets - stocks, share of mutual funds and corporate
bonds - declined from 52% to 46%. The decline was due not only to the fall in the market
value of stocks but also to substantial portfolio reallocation to safer assets, a process that itself
may have accentuated the crisis and increased market turbulence. Changes in households￿asset
allocation can be attributed not only to lower expected returns or increased risk but also to
changing attitudes to risk. Understanding how much the crisis has actually altered risk aversion
is important to gauge the evolution of the crisis and prospects for recovery. This paper tests
the extent to which risk aversion is a⁄ected by changes in wealth, as some theoretical models
predict.
The hypothesis of time-varying risk aversion has been investigated extensively. One line
of research suggests that risk aversion varies with wealth because of habit formation. Becker
and Stigler (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1988) argue that people may be addicted not only
to alcohol or cigarettes but also to consumption levels and standards of living This means
that individual welfare depends not only on how much people consume but also on whether
consumption is higher or lower than their reference level, which can be thought of as a habit
level or status. Under preferences characterized by habit formation, riskless assets represent
insurance against future consumption falling below the habit level. As a result, the optimal
demand for riskless assets is tied to the habit level of consumption. When wealth increases
relative to habit - owing, say, to capital gains - risk aversion declines and the optimal share of
risky assets increases; and the converse when wealth falls.
That is, habit formation implies that relative risk aversion varies with wealth. This can be
relevant in periods of ￿nancial boom or bust when rapid price changes in price may in￿ uence
portfolio choices not only by lowering expected future returns and increasing volatility but also
by reducing wealth. Under the hypothesis of habit formation, a reduction in wealth results in
higher risk aversion and reallocation towards safer assets which can amplify market turbulence.
Habit formation may also imply slower recovery, as the willingness to hold risky assets can not
be restored until wealth regains pre-crisis levels.
Using the framework of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), I test the predictions of the model
on data from Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW) from 1989 to 2008.
The ￿ndings support the prediction of habit formation models. In particular, changes in liquid
5wealth help to explain changes in households asset allocation. With respect to similar analyses
for US data, I control for households￿choice of holding risky assets. Most previous studies
consider only households that actually have some risky assets ignoring entry into and exit from
risky asset classes, and hence potentially censoring the observation of portfolio choices. To
tackle this problem I use the Heckman two-step procedure and obtain new and di⁄erent results.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents surveys the related literature,
Section 3 presents the model and the Euler equation that guides the estimation, Section 4
describes the data and estimation equation counterpart, Section 5 examines the aggregate
implications of the micro ￿ndings, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The literature
Habit formation models have proven very successful in explaining many dynamic asset pricing
phenomena and macroeconomic facts. In the asset pricing literature, they have been used to ex-
plain the equity premium puzzle (Constantinides (1990), Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999)), the procyclicality of stock prices, the countercyclical variation of stock market volatility
(Harvey (1989)), and the term structure of interest rates (Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2007 ). Habit
persistence frameworks may also help to explain business cycles (Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher,
2001 ), savings and growth (Carroll, Overland and Weil, 2000), and response of consumption
to monetary and other shocks (Fuhrer, 2000). In international dynamic asset pricing models
the introduction of habit formation can help to explain international market correlations and
volatilities (Aydemir, 2008 ).
Despite the successful macroeconomic applications there is still little evidence on whether
habit formation ￿ts microdata. One attempt was Dynan (2000) who tests for habit formation
using household data. Using a simple model, he derives a correlation between habit and the
evolution of consumption over time, but using data on food consumption from the Panel Study
on Income Dynamics (PSID) he ￿nds no evidence of habit formation. Ravina (2005), instead,
using US panel data on credit-card accounts in California, ￿nds a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect
of habit on household consumption choices. As noted a key implication of habit is that relative
risk aversion should vary with wealth, in contrast with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
models. Hence, an increase in wealth should imply a temporary decrease in relative risk aversion.
The empirical evidence on whether these models ￿t actual investors￿ preferences is mixed.
Lupton (2003) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) look at the implications of habit formation
for households￿stock market investment, not consumption choices as such. Lupton (2003)
estimates a proxy for habit level and shows that, consistent with the theory, it is negatively
related to the share of the household portfolio invested in stocks. By contrast, Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008) analyze the link between idiosyncratic wealth changes and portfolio allocation
and conclude against habit persistence. Wachter and Yogo (2009) develop a life-cycle model
in which households have non-homothetic utility over two types of consumption goods, basic
6and luxury. Their calibrated model predicts that the share of risky assets rises only with a
permanent increase in wealth; that is that households with higher permanent income are less
risk-averse and consequently allocate more of their wealth to stocks. To control for changes in
permanent income, Wachter and Yogo propose to use changes in consumption.
Assuming CRRA preferences Chiappori and Paiella (2008) test whether relative risk aver-
sion is constant. Using panel data for Italian households from 1989 to 2008 to analyze how
individuals￿portfolio allocation between risky and riskless assets varies in response to changes in
total ￿nancial wealth, they ￿nd the elasticity of the risky asset share to be small and statistically
insigni￿cant. That is, their study supports the CRRA hypothesis.
Here, once households￿decision to enter or leave the risky asset markets is controlled for ,
there is evidence for habit formation and time-varying risk aversion, in contrast to Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008) and Chiappori and Paiella (2008).
3 The model
I borrow the simple model of portfolio choice used by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), which
illustrates how relative risk aversion can be time-varying when agents￿preferences re￿ ect habits,
subsistence levels, or similar features. I consider a representative agent, in￿nitely lived in a
discrete time environment. The agent￿ s wealth in each period t is denoted as Wt ; it is received
before consumption, Ct, occurs. There are two assets for investment: a risky asset, with return
Rt and a riskfree asset with constant return Rf. In each period the agent chooses the level of
consumption and the proportion of saving, Wt ￿ Ct, invested in the risky asset, ￿t, in order to








subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint
Wt+1 = (1 + Rp;t+1)(Wt ￿ Ct) (2)
where ￿ is the subjective discount factor, ￿ is the curvature of the utility function, Rp;t+1 :=
￿t (Rt ￿ Rf) + Rf is the total return on the portfolio chosen, and X is habit. Consumption
paths with Ct ￿ X for some date with non-zero probability are assigned in￿nitely negative
utility. The risky asset returns have a log-normal distribution with constant expected returns
and constant volatility. In this setting expected returns and expected volatilities of all assets
are constant.1
The level of habit is assumed to be constant. This should be thought as an approximation
to a model in which X varies slowly or to a model with an external habit that does not depend
1This assumption can be relaxed once a time e⁄ect is introduced in the estimation.
7on the agent￿ s choice. This model yields the following equation:




That is, the share of risky assets depends positively on the level of habit and negatively on the
level of cash in hand. Linearizing equation 3 Brunnermeier and Nagel obtain:
￿t ￿ 1 ￿ e(x￿wt)
￿t ￿ k ￿ ￿(x ￿ wt)





, wt ￿ log(Wt ￿ Ct).2 Taking ￿rst di⁄erences gives the following equality
is obtained:
￿￿t = ￿￿wt (4)
The same relation holds with time-varying habit, but it should require that the variation in
habits is small with respect to that in wealth. Chiappori and Paiella (2008) estimate a similar
equation assuming constant risk aversion for each household but variation between households.3
To estimate equation 4 one must control for the variables outside the model that may cause
common movements in the level of wealth and the risky asset share. For example, ￿t and wt
may be correlated over the life-cycle. Therefore, I need to condition on household characteristics
that should capture such aspect. This set of variables, denoted as qt￿2, comprises variables that
are either constant or known at time t ￿ 2, and a vector of ones. In addition I include ￿ht, a
vector of variables that capture major changes in family composition or asset ownership that
could lead to preference shifts. The estimation equation becomes:
￿￿t = ￿qt￿2 + ￿￿ht + ￿￿wt + "t. (5)
Here, qt includes a broad range of variables related to the life-cycle, background, and the
￿nancial situation of the household in each period. These controls include age and age squared,
indicators for high school and college education and their interaction with age and age squared,
dummies for gender and their interaction with age and age squared, marital status, number
of children, number of persons in the household, and a dummy variable for unemployment in
the two years between two consecutive surveys. The preference-shifter set of variables, ￿ht,
comprises changes in household characteristics in the period: family size, number of children
and dummies for home ownership, business ownership, and non-zero labor income.
The previous partial equilibrium portfolio choice model concerns the decision of a single
2In SHIW it is measured as post-consumption wealth for each year, so the de￿nition of !t corresponds to the
de￿nition of wealth in the data.
3In this setting the estimate equation is not microfounded and relies on purely statistical considerations that
require heterogeneity in risk aversion to be correlated with wealth. Instead Brunnermeier and Nagel model
heterogeneity directly on the basis of habit formation.
8household, holding aggregate quantities and prices constant. But if a change in wealth is
common to all households, then they all want to change their exposure to risky assets. To
isolate the e⁄ect of habit, I must eliminate aggregate changes in wealth and asset holdings
and focus on household-speci￿c variations; accordingly, a time ￿xed e⁄ect is introduced. There
may be also local e⁄ects where asset holdings, household income and other sources of wealth
variation depend on the local economy. To control for this, I interact the year dummies with
dummies for the three SHIW geographical regions, which provides a set of year-region dummies.
These regional dummies can be interpreted as proxy of a constant or slowly changing external
habit (Grishchenko, 2005 ).
In this model agents would always invest in the stock market (￿t > 0), because the optimal
investment policy implies Wt￿Ct > X
Rf . However, if there is a cost for investing, the household
might choose not to participate (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002, Gomes and Michaelides, 2005, 2003
). This cost might be ￿nancial, opportunity (time and attention), or even psychological. By
assuming ￿xed per-period market participation costs, changes in liquid wealth could imply entry
or exit. A household whose wealth decreases might choose to exit the stock market for two
reasons: with less wealth, the bene￿ts of investing are smaller relative to the ￿xed level of costs;
and in this model with habit, as liquid wealth declines the agent wants to invest less in stocks,
further reducing the bene￿ts. To test for this e⁄ect, in appendix I also examine the empirical
relationship between changes in wealth and stock market entry and exit. This evidence could
not discriminate between CRRA and habit models. In fact, entry into and exit from risky
￿nancial markets would occur even under CRRA preferences. However, habit formation, when
the level of wealth is high enough for the investor to enter, the share of risky assets in the
portfolio does not depend on liquid wealth.
4 The data description
Following Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), I de￿ne risky liquid assets as the sum of corporate
bonds, mutual funds and listed stocks at their reported values4 and compute total liquid wealth
by adding cash-like assets (bank and postal deposits and government securities). Including
government bonds as safe assets is justi￿ed by the fact that usually they are held to maturity.
A broader de￿nition of risky ￿nancial wealth summing risky liquid assets with home equity
and equity in private business is also considered. Total ￿nancial wealth is calculated by adding
cash-like assets to this second de￿nition of risky ￿nancial assets. Two risky asset shares are
calculated: the liquid risky asset share (ratio of risky liquid assets to total liquid assets) and
the ￿nancial risky asset share (risky assets over total ￿nancial assets). The income variable is
the total household income.
Observations are weighted according to the SHIW sample weights in summary statistics
4When I check for robustness I have included also unlisted shares.
9but not in the regression analyses (see Faiella and Gambacorta, 2007 ).5 I use reported value
not adjusted for under-reporting of ￿nancial wealth (see D￿ Aurizio et al., 2006). The panel
component of SHIW has increased over time, and in the last wave was more than half of the
sample. The number of households with positive risky assets has increased but still represents
less than one ￿fth of the panel (Table 1).
Among participants in the stock markets the average share of risky assets has increased
substantially (Chiappori and Paiella, 2008: and this holds also including home and private
business equity, although it is more common to ￿nd households with some risky assets when
this equity is counted. Households with positive risky ￿nancial assets have greater ￿nancial
wealth and a larger share of risky assets.
The risky market entry variable is a dummy equal to one for households that do not partic-
ipate at t￿2 and participate at t, and zero if the household does not hold stocks at t￿2 and t.
For households that did not participated to the survey in t￿2, the variable is "missing".6 The
risky market exit variable is de￿ned in similar fashion: equal to one for participants at t ￿ 2,
but not at t, it is zero for households that participated at t ￿ 2 and t, and missing otherwise.
The proportion of households holding risky assets is 8% in the 1989-1995 sample and 18% in
1998-2008 (Table 2), a sharp increase consistent with evidence presented in Guiso et al. (2002).
The table shows that there is a very little turnover in the group of participants, suggesting
considerable inertia in Italian households￿choice of asset classes. The share of the households
with positive risky assets never exceeds 20%, compared with over 45% in the US data used
in other studies. Moreover Italian stock market investors appear to di⁄er sharply in term
of wealth and income from the other households in the survey, this not the case for the US
(see Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008). In Italy stock market participants have higher wealth
and income on average. And since much of aggregate wealth is concentrated at the top of the
distribution, wealthy households are by far the most important group of stock holders in terms of
number of shares. Compared with the US data used by Brunnermeier and Nagel, participation
in risky markets and turnover are much lower. The share of liquid wealth invested in risky
markets is scarcely a tenth of the value observed in the US surveys. These characteristics make
the Italian sample markedly di⁄erent from the one used in studies of the US household assets.
5 The results: wealth changes and asset allocation
Following Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) I estimate equation 5 conditional on participation in
the stock market in two consecutive surveys. The households holding risky assets in all periods
are included in the sample more often; those without risky assets are not in the sample.
First I estimate equation (5) by OLS using all pooled observations. The habit model predicts
that changes in liquid wealth will a⁄ect the liquid risky asset share, meaning that the coe¢ cient
5The estimation results do not change if I use weighting.
6Hence the lower number of observations.
10￿ should be statistically di⁄erent from zero. Table 3 reports the estimation results for the
sample of only households reporting a strictly positive amount of risky assets. In the ￿rst
column, the only controls are year and regional dummies, but the following columns introduce
income variables, preference-shifter controls and life-cycle controls. For all speci￿cations the
estimate of the coe¢ cient of the percentage change in liquid wealth is greater than zero but
not statistically signi￿cant. These results resemble those of Chiappori and Paiella (2008) and
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008).
This estimate assumes that both the change in liquid wealth and the changes in the risky
asset share are measured without error. If I allow for measurement error the OLS estimates
can be biased. To address this problem, I introduce instrumental variables for the variation in
liquid wealth. Like Brunnermeier and Nagel I use as instruments quantile dummies of income
growth in two consecutive waves and also include all monetary transfers, both recurrent and
occasional (excluding pensions and social subsidies), from relatives and friends not living within
the household. This last instrument is available only starting in 1995. The results are consistent
with those obtained with OLS estimates. The coe¢ cients are not statistically signi￿cant. These
results do not support the hypothesis implied by habit formation models that asset allocation
varies with wealth.
To check for robustness the analysis is repeated for every pair of consecutive surveys, and
the coe¢ cients are found to vary over time. The coe¢ cient is positive for the most recent waves
of the survey (2004-2006) which coincide with a bull stock market and a positive business cycle
and it signi￿cant for the 2006 survey (Table 4).
The fact that households holding positive risky assets are over-represented in the sample
could cause problems in the interpretation of the results. In general, truncating a sample on
the basis of the response variable (in this case stock holding) may imply inconsistent estimators
(Wooldridge, 2010[22]). In order to test for selection bias, the previous linear regression is
run controlling for a dummy variable for household￿ s inclusion in the previous or the next
wave sample, and for the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), obtained from a probit regression on the
probability of being included in the sample controlling for the lagged value of ￿nancial wealth
and the number banks at which the household has at least one current account. Table 5 shows
that none of these tests rule out a selection bias.
Adding the IMR does not generally produce a consistent estimate of the coe¢ cients if there
is a sample selection problem. In order to correct for this I use the Heckman (1979) two-step
procedure: using in the probit part household composition and life-cycle controls, past labor
income and past liquid assets.7 These variables can be justi￿ed on the basis of their relation to
risky market entry costs and the possibility of changing the portfolio allocation, even reducing
the exposure to risky assets to zero, the previous results are reversed, which is suggesting that
selection bias may be driven by latent variables (Table 6). This procedure gives a positive and
7As a robustness check other controls were tried, such as the number of bank accounts or ￿nancial transfers
received.
11signi￿cant estimate of ￿, rejecting the null hypothesis that the elasticity of risky asset share
with respect to changes in liquid wealth is equal to zero. The point estimate implies that a 10%
decline in liquid wealth induces to a decrease in the share of risky assets of almost 1 percentage
point, e.g. from 50% to 49%. This magnitude is economically signi￿cant, and it increases
if only the last three waves of the survey are considered. This evidence supports the thesis
that asset allocation varies with wealth and it contrasts with Chiappori and Paiella (2008) and
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), who do not control for sample selection. When changes in
consumption are controlled for as proposed by Wachter and Yogo (2009) the results still hold.
As a robustness check one can exclude the young, who might be subject to liquidity con-
straints, and the elderly8, whose portfolio behavior seems to be quite di⁄erent from the rest.
The estimated elasticity is slightly lower but remains statistically signi￿cant. I also exclude
households in the botton quartile of liquid wealth, in that for them changes in portfolio compo-
sition may be substantially a⁄ected by transaction costs. Again, the estimates con￿rm previous
results.
An analogous analysis takes the ￿nancial risky asset share as dependent and ￿nancial wealth
as explanatory variable. These variables include equity in private business and home equity,
which are less liquid and less divisible. This perspective would be appropriate if households with
CRRA preferences kept the proportion of ￿nancial wealth invested in risky assets, including
home equity and business wealth, roughly constant. In that case, habit formation would imply
that changes in ￿nancial wealth should lead to changes in the ￿nancial risky asset share. In
fact, the results are con￿rmed: the variation in ￿nancial wealth does in￿ uence the change in the
ratio of risky ￿nancial assets (Table 7). Point estimates imply that a 10% decline in ￿nancial
wealth induces a 5 percentage point decrease in the risky asset share. The magnitude of the
coe¢ cient is greater than in Table 3 and is signi￿cantly higher than zero. Thus, the evidence
is consistent with the predictions of the habit formation models. Estimating the same equation
for every pair of consecutive surveys con￿rms that this result is robust for all waves of the
SHIW starting in 1993 (Table 8); the coe¢ cients of ￿w are all positive and signi￿cant.9
6 Conclusion
The Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW) from 1989 to 2008 provides the
data for investigating whether households attitudes towards risk vary over time. In particular,
I test whether the propensity to hold risky assets changes with wealth, as models with habits
formation suggest. With respect to similar analyses on US data, here possible selection bias
is controlled for. That is, previous studies consider only households that actually hold some
risky assets, which means that decisions of entry or exit from risky asset classes are ignored
8De￿ned as households whose head is older than 60 years.
9This result was also obtained in Paiella and Chiappori (2008), who explained it by reference to illiquidity of
business equity holding.
12and the observations of portfolio choices are censored. This problem is dealt with by applying
the Heckman two-step procedure and this signi￿cantly a⁄ects the results. After controlling for
selection bias, there is evidence of time-varying risk aversion; households￿risk aversion rises
when wealth falls, reducing the share of risky assets held by households in favor of safer assets.
This ￿nding contrasts with those of previous studies, i.e. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and
Chiappori and Paiella (2008).
These results could be important indeed in time of boom and bust, when changes in risk
aversion can exacerbate ￿nancial markets ￿ uctuations. Apart from changes in expected returns
and volatility changes in ￿nancial wealth as such are likely to alter the propensity to hold risky
assets. A point estimate ￿nds that a decrease of 10 percent in ￿nancial wealth induces decline of
nearly 1 percentage point in the share of risky assets due exclusively to heightened risk aversion.
Increasing in risk aversion could impede the return to pre-crisis level of risky assets holdings,
as this depends on a recovery in ￿nancial wealth itself.
13Appendix: wealth changes and stock market partecipation
As Brunnermeier and Nagel have shown a model of asset allocation with habit implies that
agents always participate in the stock market. However, it is su¢ cient to assume some cost of
participating (see Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Paiella (2007)) in order for changes in liquid wealth
to induce stock market entry or exit.
This kind of relation can arise even in a model with CRRA preferences, because a decrease
in liquid wealth reduces the bene￿ts from investing in stocks relative to the ￿xed cost of par-
ticipating. In a model with habit however a decrease in liquid wealth would also increase the
risk aversion of agents who want to invest a smaller amount in risky assets, further reducing
the bene￿ts of participation.
In this light, it is interesting to investigate how changes in liquid wealth relate to stock
market participation, because the existing empirical evidence (Bertaut and Haliassos, 1995;
Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) is drawn from cross-sectional analysis and
not on panel data. Tracking changes in wealth could eliminate a possible correlation between
liquid wealth and some unobserved ￿xed household characteristics that cause stock market
participation.
Table 9 presents the results of probit regressions. The ￿rst four columns estimate the
probability of a household￿ s entering the stock market. The last four estimate the probability
of exiting the stock market. The table shows the marginal e⁄ects, that is, the e⁄ect on the
probability of entry or exit, evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables and
at the 90th percent percentile of the variation in liquid wealth. The regressions include all
the preference shifter and life-cycle controls. In the sample 1989-2008, there is a signi￿cant
coe¢ cient for the change in log liquid wealth. The point estimate of 0,01 in the ￿rst column
implies that an increase in liquid wealth of 10% implies almost a percentage point increase in
the probability of investing in stocks. For the 90th percentile in terms of change in log liquid
wealth, i.e. focusing on the households that have had a greater positive change in their liquid
wealth, the point estimate increases and the e⁄ects of a 10% increase in liquid wealth leads to
a more than 1 percentage point rise in the probability of participation. The exit regressions
in the last four columns show that the probability of exiting the stock market is negatively
related to changes in liquid wealth. The magnitudes of the point estimates are smaller than
for the entry regressions. The overall e⁄ects are similar to those obtained by Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008). To summarize, changes in liquid wealth are one of the factors in changes
in stock market participation. The positive e⁄ect is consistent with time-varying risk aversion
due to wealth changes, but it is also consistent with CRRA preferences in a model with ￿xed
per-period participation costs.
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17Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean 10th pct Median 90th pct. N
Liquid wealth 24,448 369 8,869 59,689 32,684
Financial wealth 112,063 2,898 65,590 258,821 32,686
Disposable Income 26,050 9,136 22,134 46,396 32,686
Labor Income 11,942 0 10,076 30,995 32,686
Stock mkt participation 0.081 - - - 32,686
Stock mkt entry 0.042 - - - 32,328
Stock mkt exit 0.605 - - - 32,633
Liquid wealth 30,114 174 8,753 61,298 46,916
Financial wealth 210,021 3,099 124,443 455,150 46,916
Disposable Income 27,519 9,600 22,680 49,280 46,916
Labor Income 11,206 0 8,159 29,487 46,916
Stock mkt participation 0.175 - - - 46,916
Stock mkt entry 0.073 - - - 45,590
Stock mkt exit 0.503 - - - 46,767
Liquid wealth 92,581 14,407 55,848 202,492 959
Financial wealth 305,676 53,747 209,199 644,517 960
Disposable Income 43,375 18,337 38,290 71,356 960
Labor Income 18,050 0 16,122 41,837 960
Stock mkt participation - - - - 960
Stock mkt entry - - - - 942
Stock mkt exit - - - - 960
Liquid wealth 87,320 13,206 45,839 171,609 4,604
Financial wealth 429,483 62,500 276,288 826,868 4,604
Disposable Income 42,245 18,929 36,518 68,498 4,604
Labor Income 16,650 0 14,596 39,000 4,604
Stock mkt participation - - - - 4,604
Stock mkt entry - - - - 4,604
Stock mkt exit - - - - 4604
Notes: (1) Amounts are in thousands of 2002 euros. Descriptive statistics are computed from
individual values, per year. Total liquid wealth consists of risky and riskless liquid assets. Total
financial wealth consists of risky and riskless financial assets including business equity. (2) The
number of observations refers to the number of households in the survey.
All Households, 1989 - 1995
All Households, 1998 - 2008
Stock Market Participants in the panel, 1989 - 1995
Stock Market Participants in the panel, 1998 - 2006
18Table 3: Changes in the proportion of liquid wealth invested in risky assets (OLS estimates)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
D log liquid wealth 0.009 0.0097 0.0098 0.0099
(0.0063) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
D log income - -1.4821 -1.0788 -0.8861
- (1.649) (1.769) (1.832)
Log income t-2 - 0.0293 0.746 0.711
- (1.120) (1.347) (1.377)
Preference shifter N N N Y
Life-cycle controls N N Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.086 0.0868 0.092 0.0932
N 3251 3249 3249 3249
Sample: 1989 - 2008
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is the first difference in the share of liquid wealth invested






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21Table 6: Changes in the proportion of liquid wealth invested in risky assets (Heckman two-step
procedure)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
D log liquid wealth 0.0094* 0.0102* 0.0095* 0.0095*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
D log income - 0.4974*** -0.8061 -0.6235
- (0.034) (2.300) (2.319)
Log income t-2 - 0.9441*** 1.2779 1.329
- (0.030) (3.074) (3.226)
Preference shifter N N N Y
Life-cycle controls N N Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
Probit equation
Past liquid wealth 1.07e-06 *** 1.07e-06*** 1.07e-06*** 1.07e-06***
5.61e-08 *** 5.61e-08 *** 5.61e-08 *** 5.61e-08 ***
N. banks 1.3015*** 1.3012*** 1.3013*** 1.3013***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
Past labor income 0.944*** 0.9441*** 0.9438*** 0.9438***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Preference shifter Y Y Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
N 3251 3251 3251 3251
Sample: 1989 - 2008
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is the first difference in the share of liquid wealth
invested in risky liquid assets. In the lower panel the probit first step estimation results
are reported. In the upper panel the main equation second step estimates are reported.
Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**), 10% (*).
22Table 7: Changes in the proportion of ￿nancial wealth invested in risky assets (OLS estimates)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
D log financial wealth 4.288 *** 5.641  *** 5.625 *** 5.537 ***
(-0.219) (0.298) (0.298) (0.0192)
D log income - -.945 * -1.241 ** -1.223 **
- (0.561) (0.587) (0.599)
Log income t-2 - 0.465 0.045 -0.384
- (0.527) (0.582) (0.584)
Preference shifter N N N Y
Life-cycle controls N N Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.056 0.077 0.078 0.079
N 30,377 19,787 19,787 19,787
Sample: 1989 - 2008
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is the first difference in the share of financial wealth invested in risky
financial assets. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in
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